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10.1  Introduction 
There is a growing recognition among public finance economists of the 
inappropriateness of  closed economy models for analyzing alternative 
United States tax policies. Foreign trade has increased fairly sharply as a 
fraction of  GNP  and capital markets have become more international in 
scope since the early 1960s. United States investors participate in foreign 
capital markets both directly and indirectly through multinational cor- 
porations, and foreign direct investment in the United States has grown 
enormously  since the early  1970s. In this  paper we  report on some 
alternative treatments of the external sector within an empirical general 
equilibrium model of the United States economy and tax system. This 
general equilibrium  model  has  been  described  elsewhere  (Fullerton, 
Shoven, and Whalley 1978;  Fullerton, King, Shoven, and Whalley 1981). 
The new specifications of  the external sector are motivated by the twin 
concerns of  developing a general equilibrium analysis of tax policy where 
foreign trade issues enter, and of assessing the sensitivity of earlier results 
concerning alternative  domestic tax policies to the specification of  the 
external sector. 
In previous  analyses employing this general equilibrium model, we 
have given little emphasis to foreign trade. The external or foreign sector 
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was modeled quite simply, and relatively little attention was given to how 
the foreign  sector  might  influence  the United States economy.  One 
simplifying assumption employed in previous versions of  the model was 
that for each commodity the value of  net trades between the United 
States and the rest of  the world remained unchanged as prices changed. 
This assumption provided us with a convenient way of  closing the model 
but was difficult to reconcile with utility maximization. Our alternative 
specifications are somewhat more complex but more plausible. 
The first alternative we explore is the use of  constant-elasticity excess 
demand functions (a constant-elasticity offer curve in the two-good case) 
to describe foreigners’ merchandise trade behavior. We also consider a 
variant of  this formulation in which certain imports are treated as imper- 
fect rather than perfect substitutes for comparable domestic products. 
For both of  these formulations, we consider several different elasticity 
parameters to evaluate model sensitivity. We then present two formula- 
tions which model capital mobility between the United States  and the  rest 
of the world. The first of these formulations introduces flows of  capital 
services between the United  States and abroad which depend on the 
difference between domestic and foreign rental rates. An elasticity pa- 
rameter controls the sensitivity of capital service flows to differences in 
rental  rates.  The second of  these formulations is similar but  involves 
capital goods rather than capital services. These last two formulations 
permit us to model the United States as a taker of  the rental prices of 
foreign  capital.  We were  motivated  to introduce  these  formulations 
partly by  the belief  that treating the United States in this way might 
significantly affect the model’s evaluation of  alternative tax policies. 
In order to evaluate the sensitivity of  the model to these different 
specifications,  we  analyze  the integration  of  corporate and personal 
income  taxes  (Fullerton, King,  Shoven,  and Whalley  1981) and the 
elimination of savings distortions in the United States income tax (Fuller- 
ton, Shoven, and Whalley 1982) under each of  these alternative formula- 
tions.  We also  consider  the effects of  adopting  alternative  forms of 
value-added tax (VAT) in the United States. We consider VATS of both 
the income and consumption type, and on both destination and origin 
bases. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. First, we outline the structure of the 
basic tax model before any of  the modifications we describe are incorpo- 
rated. Then, we present our alternative foreign sector formulations and 
discuss the linkage between foreign trade issues and tax policy design. A 
final section of  the paper presents results and major findings. 
10.2  Main Characteristics of the Fullerton-Shoven-Whalley 
General Equilibrium Tax Model 
The Fullerton-Shoven-Whalley  general equilibrium tax model of  the 
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traditional Edgeworth box analysis, with particular functions and param- 
eter values used to represent preferences and production possibilities.’ 
Taxes enter as ad valorem distortions of factor use, production decisions, 
and consumer purchases. The model generates sequences of  equilibria 
through time. The equilibria are connected through savings decisions that 
imply different augmentations to the capital service endowment passed 
between  periods.  The model  is  calibrated  to  1973 benchmark  data 
assumed to lie on a balanced growth path for the economy. 
The production side of the model includes nineteen profit-maximizing 
industries which use labor and capital according to constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) or Cobb-Douglas production functions. Substitution 
elasticities are chosen for each industry as the central figures in Caddy’s 
(1976) survey of  the literature and range from 0.6 to one. We use data 
from the Survey  of  Current Business  and unpublished data from the 
Commerce Department’s National Income Division to obtain each indus- 
try’s payments for labor and capital.*  Base year quantities are derived 
according to the convention that a unit of  each primary factor is that 
amount which earns one dollar net of  taxes in the 1973 benchmark year. 
A fixed coefficient input-output matrix is derived from Bureau of  Eco- 
nomic Analysis tables. 
The ad valorem tax on each industry’s use  of  capital comprises the 
corporation income tax, state corporate franchise taxes, and local prop- 
erty taxes. The social security tax and contributions to workmen’s com- 
pensation are modeled as an ad valorem tax on industry’s use of  labor. 
Various federal excise taxes and indirect business taxes are modeled as 
output taxes; a different tax rate applies to each of  the nineteen indus- 
tries. State and local sales taxes apply to each of  the fifteen consumer 
goods in  the model. 
The nineteen producer goods can be used directly by government, for 
export, or for investment. These producer goods can also be translated 
into the fifteen consumer goods which enter consumer demand functions. 
This translation is made possible by a fixed-coefficient  G matri~.~  The G 
matrix is necessary because the Commerce Department production side 
data include industries such as mining, electrical manufacturing,  and 
trade, while the Labor Department’s Survey of  Consumer Expenditures 
provides  data on purchases  of  goods like furniture, appliances, and 
recreation. 
1. The model description given in the present  paper draws heavily from section 2 in 
Fullerton  (1980). 
2. Labor compensation includes all wages, salaries, commissions, and tips, while capital 
earnings include net interest paid, net rent paid, and corporate profits with capitalconsump- 
tion adjustments and inventory valuation adjustments. Noncorporate profits were divided 
between labor and capital on the basis of  full-time-equivalent hours and average wage for 
each industry. Some industries were averaged over several years to avoid recording transi- 
tory effects. 
3. The G matrix derives from data in the February 1974 Survey of  Current Business. 336  Lawrence H. GoulderIJohn B. ShovenlJohn Whalley 
Industry and government payments to buy labor and capital services 
are exactly matched by total household receipts from the supply of each 
factor. The Treasury Department’s Merged Tax File provides informa- 
tion on labor and capital income for each of  our twelve consumer classes, 
as well as tax payments and an estimate of the average marginal income 
tax rate 7, for each group. These range from a 1%  average marginal rate 
for the first income class to a 40% rate for the highest income class. A 
progressive  income  tax system is then modeled  as a  series of  linear 
schedules, one  for each group. Pensions, IRA plans, and Keogh plans are 
modeled as a 30% saving subsidy to capture the proportion of saving that 
now has such tax-sheltered treatment. 
We also model a “personal factor tax,” a construct designed to capture 
discrimination among industries by the personal income tax. Each indus- 
try is assigned a fraction Ji’ representing the proportion of capital income 
from industry i which is fully taxable at the personal level. This fraction is 
determined from proportions of  capital income paid as noncorporate 
income, dividends,  capital gains,  interest, and rent.4 Taxable  capital 
income is subject to T, the overall capital-weighted  average marginal 
personal income tax rate. At the consumer level, rebates are given to 
groups with a 7 less than T,  while additional tax is collected from others. 
The  personal factor tax acts as a withholding tax at the industry level, and 
corrections at the consumer level sum to zero. The model thus captures 
the favorable tax treatment given to industries with noncorporate invest- 
ment tax credit and to the housing industry. 
The expanded income of  each consumer group is given by  transfer 
income plus capital and labor endowments.’ The latter is defined as 714 of 
labor income. The figure 7/4 results from our estimate that in the bench- 
mark, forty hours are worked out of  a possible seventy hours. Consumer 
demands are based on budget-constrained maximization of  the nested 
CES utility function: 
U = U H  C Xi’J ,C’  .  [  (i”l  j  ] 
In the first stage, consumers  save some income for future consumption C, 
and allocate the rest to a subutility function Hover  present consumption 
goods Xi and leisure 1. The elasticity of substitution between C, and H is 
based on Boskin’s (1978) estimate of 0.4 for the elasticity of saving with 
4.  All dividends are 96% taxable, because of the 4% that fell under the $100 exclusion in 
1973. All retained earnings are 73% taxable. This results from the value tax deferral and 
rate advantages for capital gains, as well as the taxation of  purely nominal gains. Interest 
and rents are fully taxable except for the imputed net rent of  owner-occupied homes, while 
the noncorporate investment tax credit also appears as a personal tax reduction varying by 
industry. 
5. Portfolio effects are ignored because dividends, capital gains, interest, rent, and other 
types of  capital income are summed to obtain capital endowments. 337  Domestic Tax Policy and the Foreign Sector 
respect to the net-of-tax rate of return. Saving in the model derives from 
consumer demands  for future consumption under the expectation that all 
present prices, including the price of  capital, will prevail in all future 
periods. Then income for H is divided between the purchase of  leisure 1 
and the purchase of a bundle of  fifteen consumer goods. The composition 
of the consumer-good bundle derives from the maximization of a Cobb- 
Douglas function. The elasticity  of  substitution  between  leisure  and 
consumer goods is based on an estimate of 0.15 for the elasticity of labor 
supply with respect to the net-of-tax wage. 
Consumer decisions regarding factor supplies are thus made jointly 
with  consumption decisions.  Demands for leisure and for saving will 
depend on all relative  prices, whether for factor  endowments or for 
commodity purchases. Saving is converted immediately into investment 
demand for producer goods, with proportions  based on  national account- 
ing data for fixed private investment and inventories. 
In previous versions of the model, the foreign trade sector has been 
modeled such that the net value of  exports less imports is constant for 
each producer good. This simple treatment closed the model, maintained 
zero trade balance, and allowed  easy calculation  of  trade quantities, 
given prices. As we shall see in the next section, however, this specifica- 
tion  was  hard  to reconcile  with  traditional  trade theory; hence  the 
alternative external sector formulations. 
The specification of  the government sector completes the model. Rev- 
enues from the various taxes described  above are used for transfers, 
labor, capital, and producer goods. Lump-sum transfers to each con- 
sumer group are based on Treasury Department data for social security, 
welfare,  government retirement, food stamps, and similar programs. 
Government demands for factors and commodities are represented by a 
linear expenditure system derived from a Stone-Geary  utility function. In 
equilibrium the government budget is balanced. 
Because the benchmark data required for this model are so compre- 
hensive, the sources are necessarily divergent. The two sides of  a single 
account are often collected by different agencies with different proce- 
dures, and thus do not match. In order to use all of these data together, 
there must be adjustments to ensure that each part is consistent with the 
rest. To do this we accept some data as superior and other data are 
adjusted to match. All industry and government uses of factors are taken 
to be fixed, so consumers’ factor incomes and expenditures must be 
scaled.  Tax receipts, transfers, and government endowments  are fixed, so 
government expenditures  must be scaled to balance their budget. Similar 
adjustments ensure that supply equals demand for all goods and factors.‘ 
6. In particular, the input-output matrix does not conform to the requirement that gross 
output of  each good can be measured by the column sum plus value added, or the row sum 
plus final demand. An iterative row and column scaling method is employed to generate a 
consistent matrix, and similar scaling satisfies similar conditions for the expenditure matrix. 338  Lawrence H. GoulderIJohn B. ShovenIJohn Whalley 
The fully consistent data set then represents a benchmark equilibrium, 
where values are separated into prices and quantities by assuming that a 
physical unit of  each good and factor is the amount that sells for one 
dollar. Certain elasticity parameters are imposed exogenously, and the 
model’s equilibrium conditions are used to generate remaining behav- 
ioral equation parameters which are consistent with the data set. Factor 
employments by industry are used to derive production function weights, 
and household expenditures are used to derive utility function and de- 
mand function weights. We can use  the resulting tax rates, function 
parameters, and endowments to solve the model, perfectly replicating 
the benchmark equilibriunm. This calibration allows for a test of  the 
solution procedure and ensures that the various agents’ behaviors are 
mutually consistent in our benchmark data set. 
We use the Merrill(l971) variant of Scarf’s (1973) algorithm to solve in 
each period for a competitive equilibrium in which profits are zero and 
supply equals demand for each good or factor. Simplex dimensions are 
required only for labor, capital, and government revenue, since a knowl- 
edge of  these three “prices” is sufficient to evaluate all agent behavior. 
Producer-good prices are calculated on the basis of factor prices and the 
zero-profits  condition,  while  consumer-good prices  derive  from  pro- 
ducer-good prices through the G transition matrix. A complete set of 
prices,  quantities,  incomes,  and  allocations  is  calculated  for  every 
equilibrium. Since it is not based on differential calculus, the computa- 
tional model can accommodate discrete changes in any tax or distortion 
without linearity assumptions and without ignoring income effects. There 
can  be  any number  of  sectors and agents, and  any specifications of 
demand, so long as Walras’s law holds. 
The dynamic sequencing of  single-period equilibria in the model first 
assumes that the 1973 consistent data set or benchmark equilibrium lies 
on a steady-state growth path. Observed saving behavior and the capital 
endowment are translated into an annual growth rate for capital (approx- 
imately 2.75%), and this growth is also attributed to effective labor units. 
This exogenous growth rate for labor is split evenly between population 
growth and Harrod-neutral technical progress. The benchmark sequence 
of equilibria is then calculated by  maintaining all tax rates and prefer- 
ences, increasing labor exogenously, and allowing saving to augment 
capital endowments over time.’ By construction, this sequence will have 
constant factor ratios and constant prices all equal to one. 
Policy change simulations are performed by  altering tax rates while 
retaining preference parameters and the exogenous labor growth rate. 
7.  We convert a dollar of  saving into capital service rental units through multiplication 
by y, the real after-tax rate of  return. The model assumes that twenty-five dollars of  saving 
can purchase a capital asset that will earn one dollar per period net of  depreciation and 
taxes. That is, a value of  0.04 is used for y. 339  Domestic Tax Policy and the Foreign Sector 
Saving and other behavior  then conform to the specified elasticities, 
growth of capital diverges from the steady-state rate, and the economy 
begins to  approach a new steady-state path with a new capitaYlabor ratio. 
Sequences are compared by  discounting the H  composites of  instan- 
taneous consumption through time with appropriate terminal conditions. 
Only leisure and present consumption are included in this welfare mea- 
sure because saving is reflected in later consumption of the sequence. The 
sequence is discounted at a 4%  rate and includes only the initial popula- 
tion. Otherwise, the importance of future periods would be sensitive to 
population growth. 
The welfare gain or loss of a tax change is the aggregate compensating 
variation, defined as the number of  dollars at new prices that would be 
required for each consumer to attain the old sequence of  consumption 
values. The model thus incorporates both interindustry and intertempo- 
ral tax distortions and efficiency changes. 
10.3  Different External Sector Formulations 
In this section we outline alternative ways of modeling external sector 
behavior in the general equilibrium tax model of  the United States. In 
section  10.4 we  explore the sensitivity of  results from various policy 
simulations to the external sector specifications. 
10.3.1 
The external  sector modeling currently  used  in  the  United  States 
general equilibrium tax model focuses solely on commodity trade and 
ignores all capital transactions. Exports and imports are classified into 
three categories of producer goods: those for which there are net imports 
(seven commodities); those for which there are net exports (seven com- 
modities); and those which are not traded (five commodities). The bench- 
mark data set for 1973 is adjusted to guarantee that the value of  total 
exports equals the value of  total imports. The model then assumes that 
the value of net exports remains constant for each export commodity and 
the value of  net imports remains constant for those commodities which 
are imported. For each of  the import commodities we have 
The Existing Foreign Sector Specification 
and for the export commodities we have 
P.E.  = EQ 
I  I  I’ 
where MP and EP  are the benchmark net import and export quantities, 
respectively.  Recall that the benchmark prices are unity, by  the units 
assumptions. 8,  Mi,  4, and Ei  are the current prices and quantities for 
imports and exports. Since initially 340  Lawrence H. GoulderIJohn B. Shoved  John Whalley 
CEP= CMP, 
i  i  (3.3) 
we always have the condition that 
(3.4)  2$Ej  = CeM,, 
or the value of  exports equals the value of  imports. This trade balance 
condition is necessary in a general equilibrium model that does not allow 
for international capital flows. 
This modeling  has  several  drawbacks.  First,  commodities  cannot 
switch between being imported and being exported. Far more serious is 
the feature that import supply by foreigners reacts perversely to changes 
in commodity prices: this specification has import supplies negatively 
related to prices with an elasticity of  -  1. 
A related problem with this treatment is that in the two-good analogue 
it implies an offer curve which is different from those usually found in 
traditional trade theory. This difficulty is transparent if  we plot, for the 
two-good case, the foreign offer curve the United States economy is 
assumed to face. Suppose E and M each now refer to  scalars rather than 
vectors; the constant-value net trade formulation implies 
(3.5)  E = E'PF', 
(3.6)  M = M'PG',', 
where I?'  and M" are base year exports and imports, and PE and PM are 
export and import prices, respectively. When superimposed on a diagram 
incorporating the usual form of home country offer curve (figure 10.2), 
this is seen to violate traditional  trade theory on two counts:  (a) the 
foreign offer curve does not go through the origin; and (b)  the foreign 
offer curve is concave rather than convex to the M axis. 
Clearly this simple formulation contains some major departures from 
traditional trade theory; consequently, we consider a number of alterna- 
tive external sector formulations. 
10.3.2  General Constant Elasticity Specification 
The first alternative specification differs from the simple specification 
above in two main ways.8  First, import supply functions are modeled so as 
to have a positive price elasticity. Second, the restrictive Cobb-Douglas 
type assumption of  the previous specification-the  assumption that the 
value of net exports remains constant for each commodity-is  no longer 
employed. 
8. This section relies on material presented in Whalley and Yeung (1980), which ana- 
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Fig. 10.1  Diagram of  foreign offer curve. 
In this formulation, the relative prices of  traded goods are endoge- 
nously  determined in the model.  Trade balance is assured since for- 
eigners’ excess demand functions (export demand and import supply) 
satisfy budget balance. 
This specification operates as follows. For each of the n producer goods 
(in the case of  our model, n = 19), we specify an import supply function 
and an export demand function,  with  parameters  p and q as  price 
elasticities of  import supply and export demand, respectively: 
(3.7)  Mi=M@)”  O<F<X, 




Foreign  Offer Curve 




Fig.  10.2  Diagram of  foreign offer curve with superimposition of  tradi- 
tional home offer curve. 
where PMi  is the domestic price of  imports and PEi  is the domestic price of 
United  States exports (cost-covering  price  received  by  United States 
producers). The variable e can be interpreted as an exchange rate be- 
tween domestic and foreign prices although we will show below how e can 
be removed by a simple substitution into the trade balance equation. As 
in all classical general equilibrium models which focus solely on relative 
goods prices, this exchange rate is a purely financial magnitude with no 
significance for real  behavior  in  long-run  equilibrium,  although  it  is 
helpful for our exposition if we use this terminology.’ PMi/e  is the price the 
foreign exporter receives, and PEJe  is the price foreign purchasers must 
9. No well-defined financial sectors are specified in our model; there is no domestic or 
foreign demand-for-money function which determines the relative prices of  domestic and 
foreign monies (the exchange rate) in  a purely monetary sense. 343  Domestic Tax Policy and the Foreign Sector 
pay  for United States exports. The sign restrictions on p and  q are 
discussed below. 
In order to close the system and solve the general equilibrium model, 
we add the trade balance constraint that 
n  n 
i= 1  I= I  C  PMiMi = 2  PEiE,.  (3.8) 
If  we substitute for Mi  and Ei  from equation (3.7), we have 
(3.9) 
If  we now define 
n 
i= 1 




a2  =  C  (PEi)V+%Y, 
i= I 
equation (3.9) can be solved for the exchange rate parameter 
(3.11) 
Finally, substituting this result in (3.7) gives 
(3.12) 
(3.13) 
Note that a1  and a2  are themselves functions of import and export prices, 
respectively. Equations (3.12) and (3.13) can be thought of  as reduced- 
form import supply and export demand equations. Another interpreta- 
tion is that they are the external sector behavior equations compensated 
for zero trade balance.  They reflect  the fact  that one cannot simply 
specify an import supply elasticity and an export demand elasticity, and 
simultaneously assume zero trade balance. The trade balance condition 
provides a cross-equation restriction implicit in our solution procedure 
for equations (3.12) and (3.13). 
Another thing  to note about the reduced-form  import  supply  and 
export demand equations  is that they depend only on domestic prices: the 
exchange rate has been eliminated by substitution. Thus equations (3.12) 
and (3.13) depend only upon the real terms of trade given by the (a2/aI) 
term. 
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system (3.7) specifies an offer curve of  constant elasticity which describes 
the excess demand functions for the foreign sector. The elasticity of  the 
offer curve is 
and this parameter eoC  is related to the price elasticity of  both foreign 
export demand and foreign import  supply through the equation (see 
Johnson 1953, chapter 2, appendix) 
(3.15) 
where 
and import supply. 
the system, 
and EL’ define the foreign price elasticities of export demand 
This implies that in terms of  the reduced-form equations  characterizing 
(3.16) 
which for q 5 -  1, p > 0 implies €FED  5  0. Also, 
(3.17) 
and for p 2 0, q 5 -1, €E  > 0. 
These elasticities imply that the true price elasticities of the system of 
foreign excess demand functions are not in fact given by q and p as the 
equations (3.7)  might  seem to suggest, but  by the more complicated 
forms  described  above.  Furthermore, p  and q are not  independent 
parameters but jointly imply an elasticity for the offer surfaces we use. To 
have the appropriate sign for the value of €2,  q must be less than -  1 
rather than simply negative as stated above. 
Because of  the form properties of  this system, we describe this spec- 
ification of the external  sector as one  where the United States  is a taker of 
a foreign offer surface (satisfying a foreign economy version of  Walras’s 
law) of constant-elasticity form. The  form of  utility functions necessary to 
generate such surfaces is discussed more fully in Johnson (1953), and 
Gorman (1957). In the section in which we present our  results, we discuss 
further our choice of  p and q. 
When we  analyze trade in  homogeneous  products, it  is natural to 
assume that a country will not import and export the same good. This 
assumption can be expressed as 
(3.18)  E:M:=O  i= 1, ...,  n. 345  Domestic Tax Policy and the Foreign Sector 
However, the assumption  is  violated  by  empirical  data: there are a 
number of  commodities which are both exported and imported by the 
United States. This phenomenon of “cross-hauling” is evident from trade 
statistics, even with finely aggregated data, and underlies much of the 
recent literature on intraindustry trade (see Grubel and Lloyd 1975 and 
the subsequent literature). 
There are many reasons for this phenomenon. In some cases, cross- 
hauling is  dictated by  explicitly noncompetitive behavior, such as that 
mandated  by  the  United  States-Canada  automobile manufacturing 
agreement. However, it is also possible to reconcile cross-hauling with 
competitive behavior. One explanation asserts that foreign commodities 
are qualitatively different from domestic goods. This assumption of  qual- 
itative difference by country (e.g. United States and foreign cars being 
treated as close but not perfect substitutes) is referred to as the “Arming- 
ton assumption,” following Armington (1969). Cross-hauling can also be 
explained by reference to  geography and transportation  costs. For exam- 
ple, it may be perfectly sensible for the United States to export Alaskan 
oil to Japan and at the same time import oil through ports on the East 
Coast and the Gulf of  Mexico, given the cost of delivering Alaskan oil to 
the eastern United States. 
Previous versions of the model dealt only with net trade flows, as if 
trade occurred only in one direction for each commodity and there were 
no cross-hauling. In each of the new formulations, it is possible to deal 
only with net trades, as before, or alternatively to allow for cross-hauling. 
When cross-hauling is specified, it is necessary to substitute gross trade 
flows for net trade flows in the export demand and import supply equa- 
tions. (For example, E: and My  would represent gross magnitudes in the 
base year in the previous equations in this section.) Although our for- 
mulations  can  incorporate cross-hauling,  the  reasons  for  the  cross- 
hauling are not explicitly provided by the model. 
10.3.3  Trade Modeling with Imperfectly Substitutable Imports 
Our second external sector specification separates imports into two 
broad categories, depending on whether they are perfect or imperfect 
substitutes in production for domestically produced intermediate goods. 
We treat all of  the imports discussed in previous subsections as perfect 
substitutes in production  for United States producer goods. We then 
represent these imports as a negative component of final demand; as a 
consequence, every additional unit of  import of  producer good i reduces 
the gross output requirement of  industry  i in  the model. Industries 
demanding  intermediate goods from industry  i are assumed to be indiffer- 
ent as to whether those goods are produced at home or imported. 
We now consider a model specification which allows some imports to 
be imperfect substitutes for domestic goods in production.  Under this 346  Lawrence H. Goulder/John B. ShovenIJohn Whalley 
specification, we introduce a single new aggregated import commodity 
which  enters the production  structure  as an imperfectly substitutable 
input.  ‘‘I  This specification invokes the Armington assumption, since it 
assumes that there is a qualitative difference between the imported input 
and any domestic inputs used in production (Armington 1969). 





i= 1,  ...,  n, 
z=l,  ...,  n, 
where  (3.21)  is  the supply function  for the import  commodity  (“re- 
source”) which enters  the production structure.  This commodity is differ- 
ent from  all domestically  available goods.  The demand  for imported 
resources is a derived demand based on production requirements (as with 
the other factors of  production, labor  and capital). MY  and EY  may 
represent either gross or net magnitudes as desired. 
The trade balance condition is now 
n  n 
PRR+  2  PMiM;= X PEiE;. 










y2 = ,2  (PEi)‘‘+lEy. 
Then, substituting (3.19), (3.20), and (3.21) into (3.22) and using the 
above notation, we get 
(3.25) 
and 
10. The quantities of  this imperfectly substitutable import into each industry were based 
on  rows 80A and 80B of  the 1971 United States  input-output matrix published by the Bureau 
of  Economic Analysis of  the Department of  Commerce. 347  Domestic Tax Policy and the Foreign Sector 
(3.27) 
-T4w-T) 
(3.28)  R = R'Pk  (2) 
As in the previous section, these are the reduced-form or (trade balance) 
compensated import supply and export demand equations. They provide 
a constant elasticity set of excess demand functions to describe foreign 
behavior. 
With this formulation, the production structure has also been modified 
to incorporate the imported resource.  In the previous version  of  the 
model, the production function for each sector could be written as 
(3.29) 
where  the ail  (i = 1,.  .  . ,n) are the fixed  per unit  intermediate input 
requirements, xij  are the available intermediate inputs, VA(*;) is a CES 
value added function with capital (Kj) and labor (L,)  as inputs, and ao, is 
the requirement of value added per unit of output. 
Under this new specification, the production function is 
(3.30) 
X  Lj),  R],  3,.  . . 
"lj  q,  anj 
where J is a CES or Cobb-Douglas function for each sector, and ao, now 
represents the requirements of  the resourcehalue added composite per 
unit of output. A critical parameter in this formulation is the value chosen 
for the elasticity of substitution  between  R  and VA(Kj, Lj)  for each 
sector. We denote these elasticities by  We will return to the choice 
of  values for 
The solution  procedure takes advantage of  the separability of  the 
production  structure  , as  in  the  original  Fullerton-Shoven-Whalley 
model. Each producer first calculates the optimal factor proportions to 
use  in  his  value  added function, given  the minimum factor  costs of 
production. From this information, the optimal combination of domestic 
factor value added and imported resources can be determined by mini- 
mizing the per unit cost of  the J  function. From this solution, we can 
compute all domestic producer prices using the Samuelson nonsubstitu- 
tion theorem. These prices can be used to determine the government's 
demand for producer products, the foreign demand for producer goods 
(exports), and the supply of  both producer-good imports and resource 
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while the factor prices and the government revenue determine consumer 
incomes. Consumer demands are evaluated, and the derived demands  for 
producer goods necessary to meet consumer demand for consumption 
and investment goods are computed. With these components, we can 
obtain the demand for domestically supplied producer goods, from which 
the derived demand for labor, capital, and imported resources is deter- 
mined. Further, from all the transactions in the model, government tax 
receipts can be calculated. The excess demand for labor, capital,  re- 
sources, and government revenue is  then  computed, and the model 
proceeds as in earlier versions, until an equilibrium set of  prices and tax 
revenue is found where all markets clear. 
This specification presents two additional data requirements. We use a 
modified version of the 1970 United States  input-output table underlying 
our 1973 benchmark data, to separately identify a row of factor imports 
by industry in our input-output data. We also need to specify a substitu- 
tion elasticity between United States value added and R. For these, we 
use estimates of  the aggregate import price elasticity of import demand 
for the United States. In the central case we take the value (from Stern, 
Francis, and Schumacher 1977) of 1.7 to represent the pure substitution 
effect between domestic value added and imported resources, and take 
0.5, 1.0, and 3.0 as sensitivity cases. 
10.3.4  A Simple Modeling of  International Capital Flows 
To this point, our model formulations have not accounted for interna- 
tional capital flows. From a modeling perspective, however, it is very 
important whether  a  single  international  capital  market or separate 
national capital market is considered, since this choice may significantly 
affect the perceived impact of  a tax change. In this subsection, we present 
a simple formulation of  international capital flows which allows foreign 
rental rates on capital to affect rental rates in the United States. 
Here  we add one consumer to the model-a  “foreigner” endowed with 
large quantities of those commodities which the United States imports or 
exports, and with a large amount of capital services. In the benchmark 
year, the foreigner’s endowment of  each import or export commodity is 
usually set at five times the benchmark level of imports of that commodity 
by the United States, while the foreigner’s capital services endowment is 
five times the United States capital services endowment in the bench- 
mark. As part of  a sensitivity analysis we have varied the magnitudes of 
the foreigner’s endowments of  goods and capital services. The foreigner 
“consumes” most of  his endowments; that is, most of  these import goods 
and capital services are used by the foreign economy rather than sold or 
rented to the United States. In the benchmark, in particular,  the for- 
eigner sells just the observed amount of import commodities (a fifth of his 
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quantity of  export commodities (also a fifth of  his endowment) from the 
United States.  The  foreigner rents no capital services to the United States 
in the benchmark; he thus consumes his entire endowment of  capital 
services. A loose interpretation would be that these capital services are 
foreign resources which provide directly consumable output to the for- 
eigner. 
As United States prices change with a tax change, however, the for- 
eigner alters his behavior. If  the United  States rental price of  capital 
increases above the foreign rental price (exogenously fixed in real terms), 
the foreigner will “rent” some of  his endowment to be used in United 
States production (i.e. there will be a capital inflow from the perspective 
of  the United States). On the other hand, should the United States  rental 
price of  capital fall below the foreign rental price, the foreigner may 
“rent” United States capital for his foreign consumption (i.e. a capital 
outflow from the United States perspective). 
(3.31)  WK -  XK  = WK(PK/PKF)  , 
where  WK is the capital  service endowment  of  the foreigner, XK  are 
capital services rented to the United States by  the foreigner (or rented 
from the United States if XK  is negative), and EK  is an elasticity param- 
eter controlling capital flow responses in the model. PK and PKF  are the 
rental rates of capital in the United States  and abroad, respectively. Since 
PK = PKF  = 1  in the benchmark, the benchmark value of  XK  is zero. 
The critical parameters in this formulation are the ratio of  WK  to the 
United States capital service endowment (five in our central case analy- 
sis)  and EK.  EK should  be negative  to give  the capital  service flow 
responses we require. In our central case  EK  is  -1.0.  For sensitivity 
analysis, we use values for EK  ranging from zero to -  10.0. 
Equation (3.31) thus determines capital service flows in the model, 
once factor prices are known. A two-stage procedure is thus involved in 
determining foreign behavior. We first determine X,,  and from this we 
calculate income remaining to  be spent on all other goods. For simplicity, 
the expenditure on other goods follows a Cobb-Douglas specification, 
with weights determined from benchmark data. A point worth noting is 
that equation (3.31) is not explicitly  derived  from utility-maximizing 
behavior of  the foreigner. We focus on welfare evaluations for the United 
States only, and treat our model of the foreign sector as a model closure 
system which  satisfies external sector balance  and has the qualitative 
properties we desire. 
Our motivation for this formulation incorporating capital service flows 
relates  to  the  recent  debate  between  Feldstein  (see  Feldstein  and 
Horioka  1980) and Harberger (1980) about the degree to which  the 
United States operates in a relatively competitive world capital market. 
This behavior is specified as 
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Feldstein, observing a high correlation between the savings of  countries 
and their  investment, argues that there are severe restrictions on the 
operation of a world capital market. Harberger asserts that this correla- 
tion is not so large and that this statistic is not sufficient evidence for 
concluding the malfunctioning of  the world capital market. 
This issue is important because of  its implications for policy evaluation 
from general equilibrium tax models. In a world with a perfect, friction- 
less international capital market ,  the domestic choice between an income 
and consumption  tax  would  not  affect  the aggregate  employment of 
capital in the United States. Despite the fact that an income tax discour- 
ages saving by  United  States consumers and thus tends to discourage 
capital  formation, the rest  of  the world  would  provide  United  States 
industry with capital until its rate of  return was equal to the world level. 
However, an origin-based  tax such as the United  States corporation 
income tax would  still be distortionary, affecting both the amount of 
capital in the economy and its allocation across industrial sectors. In their 
most recent exchange, Feldstein and Harberger seemed to be converging 
to the view that, while there is some pressure toward equalizing the rates 
of  return to capital across world markets, this equilibrium is incomplete 
and even the partial movements observed take substantial amounts of 
time. We can capture the key aspects of  this debate by altering EK,  the 
elasticity parameter for the demand for capital services by foreigners. 
10.3.5  An Extension of  the Capital Flows Modeling 
The previous subsection has the rest of the world endowed with a large 
amount of  capital services which it “rents” to the United States if  the 
United States offers a higher rental price. If the rental price in the United 
States falls, the foreigner rents capital from the United States. While this 
is a step toward including world capital markets in our model, it fails to 
capture important aspects of  foreign investment. Under this specifica- 
tion, a capital inflow involves a financial outflow (the United States must 
make the rental payments). In fact,  the principal response to high United 
States rates of return is more likely to be direct foreign investment in the 
United States rather than the rental  to the United States of  foreign- 
owned capital. The  rest of  the world wouldpurchase United States capital 
goods, providing an immediate financial inflow. Foreigners would then 
accumulate a claim on the future earnings of their acquired capital rather 
than receive immediate financial compensation. 
This behavior can be incorporated  in our model using a somewhat 
different representation  of the “foreigner.”  The initial United  States 
capital endowment of the foreigner is taken as zero. The foreigner, 
however, can acquire United  States capital by  purchasing the savings 
good (the 16th consumer good, which is a fixed proportion portfolio of 
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United States investments rises above the expected rate of  return on 
foreign investments. This  will generate a capital and monetary flow. He is 
interested in the rate of  return net of  the corporation income tax, the 
corporation franchise tax, and property taxes. Should the United States 
rate of  return fall relative to  the foreign rate, he may sell foreign capital to 
domestic savers. Once again, we do  not model the production structure 
of  the rest of  the world; rather, the foreigner simply “consumes” foreign 
capital as in the previous subsection. 
This formulation is reasonably complex in terms of  modeling. There 
now  are two kinds of  capital  goods, foreign  and domestic,  offering 
separate  (although  conceivably  identical)  rates  of  return.  Initially, 
domestic consumers own only domestic capital and the foreigner owns 
only foreign capital. The demand functions are structured such that the 
foreigners will save in the United States only if the United States rate of 
return rises above the foreign rate, whereas the United States consumers 
will purchase foreign capital service endowments  only if the United States 
rate of return falls below the foreign rate. While the United States  rate of 
return is endogenous in the model, the foreign rate is usually set at the 
benchmark rate, although it can be influenced by certain tax policies of 
the United States.” 
Savings behavior in the United States stems from the same demand 
functions as in the Fullerton-Shoven-Whalley  model, except that it in- 
volves not just a domestic savings good but a composite savings good 
aggregated over domestic and foreign savings goods. For each house- 
hold, 
(3.32)  sD=  ps, 
sF  = (1 -  p)s, 
where S is total savings, and SD  and SF  are domestic and foreign savings 
goods acquired. p is  a  distribution parameter which  depends on the 
relation between domestic and foreign rates of  return (IF, rUS): 
(3.33)  p=1  if  rUS2rF, 
p = exp[ --z1(rF-  rus)]  if  rUS<rF. 
Here rF  and rus are expected rates of  return to United States consumers. 
Because of  differences in marginal tax rates, rF  and rus each will differ 
across the twelve  household  classes distinguished  by  the model. We 
account for these differences in the model, although for convenience we 
speak of  a single rF and rus in this discussion. 
11. For example, in this model the foreign rate of return would be affected by a United 
States policy changing the percentage of United States consumers’ savings which can be 
deducted from taxable income. Such a policy alters the after-tax price of savings to United 
States consumers, whether the savings are at  home or  abroad. Consequently, the policy 
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In the benchmark rF  = rus = 1 and p = 1 (United States households 
buy no foreign capital goods). In the solution of the model, p for each 
household is used to form a composite price for savings goods which 
enters household budget constraints. Household utility functions only 
have an interpretation over composite goods since we do not investigate 
real characteristics of  assets (such as risk) which would  account for a 
diversified  portfolio by  savers. We set Z1,  the elasticity parameter in 
equation (3.33), at 250 in our central case. We consider this figure to be 
roughly comparable to  the E,value  of -  1  .0 in the previous specification. 
The foreigner’s savings in the United States, SGs, are given by 
(3.34)  SFs = 0  if  rF  srF, 
~6~  = z2(r~s  -  r;jZ3  if  rgs>rF. 
.  us  F 
Here rys and r$are United States and foreign rates of  return expected by 
the foreigner. Because United States consumers and foreigners are not 
treated identically in the tax system, rus  generally differs from rgs, and rF 
from rF. 
A two-stage procedure similar to that in subsection 10.3.4  applies here. 
First, we determine the foreigner’s investment  behavior  abroad, with 
remaining expenditures  allocated  in  a Cobb-Douglas fashion. In our 
central case analysis, we take Z2  to equal 50,000 and 2, to equal 0.5. In 
this specification, our dynamic sequencing of equilibria takes account of 
previous investments abroad in determining capital service endowments 
in  each country in each period. Investments abroad in a given period 
imply international capital service flows in subsequent periods. 
In the following section, we investigate how the model’s findings are 
affected by the four formulations we have just described. 
10.4  Policy Analyses under Alternative 
External Sector Formulations 
In this section we examine results from a number of  policy analyses, 
using the various formulations of external sector behavior presented in 
the preceding section. We consider the introduction of  an 80% savings 
deduction in the United States income tax (as considered by Fullerton, 
Shoven, and Whalley 1982). We also consider corporate tax integration 
in  the United States (as considered by Fullerton, King, Shoven, and 
Whalley 1981), and the introduction of  alternative forms of  value-added 
tax in the United States. 
We use the same dynamic sequence of equilibria approach used in the 
earlier papers by Fullerton et al. and compute sequences of  equilibria 
linked through household savings decisions, as described earlier. In the 
base case, the economy is assumed to  lie on a balance growth path. Under 
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growth and asymptotically returns to a new balanced growth path with a 
different ratio of  capital service to labor endowment in each period. Our 
welfare analysis of  gain or loss to the economy involves a calculation of 
the Hicksian compensating variation in each period for each household 
group. We first discount into present value terms, using the real net of 
return to  capital as the discount rate, and then we sum over households. 
Our analyses involve the same numerical specification used by Fuller- 
ton et al. We analyze six periods, each of ten years’ duration, using the 
same values for all parameters which do not deal with the external  sector. 
The various external sector formulations are incorporated as separate 
model extensions. 
We refer to the four formulations as follows: 
1. CONS ELAS NO ARM 
2.  CONS ELAS WITH ARM 
3.  CAP SERV FLOW 
4.  CAP GOOD FLOW 
Foreigners’  behavior  involves  con- 
stant-elasticity demand functions (con- 
stant-elasticity offer curve in two-good 
case); no  Armington  product  heter- 
ogeneity enters; no capital service or 
capital good flows are considered. 
As in (1) except that we also consider 
Armington product  heterogeneity  for 
certain imported inputs. 
Flows of capital services take place be- 
tween the United States and the rest of 
the world. 
Flows of  capital goods take place be- 
tween the United States and the rest of 
the world. 
These formulations  were described above in subsections 10.3.2,10.3.3, 
10.3.4, and 10.3.5, respectively. 
These formulations are listed in table 10.1 along with the values we 
have specified for the more critical parameters. In the case of  the first 
formulation, the parameters p and q imply  an export price elasticity 
which the United States faces. We use an export price elasticity for the 
foreigner’s demands of -  1.4.  This is approximately the central  case value 
reported in the recent compendium of  Stern, Francis, and Schumacher 
(1977). We use values for p  of 0.465 and q of  -  10. These jointly imply 
the -  1.4 export price elasticity; the implied elasticity of the foreigner’s 
import supply function is approximately 0.4. 
For sensitivity analyses in this case, we consider p  and q  set first at 10 
and -  10 and then at 1 and -  1. For the 10, -  10 case the export price 
elasticity is approximately  -5.  In the two-good case, as -q  and p both 
become  large  (in  absolute value),  the  elasticity  of  the  offer  curve 
approaches unity and this specification for the foreigner’s behavior would 
imply that the United States is a small, open, price-taking economy. For Table 10.1  Characteristics of Alternative External Sector Specifications 
CAP GOOD  CONS ELAS  CONS ELAS  CAP SERV 













no capital flows, 
gross trade flows 
k, rl 
p =  ,465 
q =  -10 
(jointly imply U.S. 
faces export price 
elasticity of -  1.4) 
p = 10,q =  -10 
p = l,q =  -1 
Net rather than 







for intermediate imports, 
no capital flows, 
gross trade flows 
k?  q>  URVA 
p = ,465 
atA  = 1.7 
T=  -10 
uCA = 0.5, 1.0, 3.0 
10.3.4 
Capital service flows, 
no product heterogeneity, 
Cobb-Douglas commodity 
demands, gross trade 
flows 
E,,  RATIO* 
E,=  -1 
RATIO = 5 
EK = 0, -0.1,  -10.0 
RATIO  = 2, 10 
Gross-of-tax rather 
than net-of-tax return 









Z,, 22,  Z3, RATIO* 
Z1 = 250 
Z, = 50,000 
RATIO = 5 
23  = 0.5 
z,  = 1,000, 100, 10 
z*  = 100,000 
Z3 = .25, 1.0 
RATIO = 2.  10 
*RATIO represents the ratio of  the foreigner’s benchmark endowments of  capital services, input commodities, and export commodities to the United 
States benchmark endowments of  capital services, level of  imports, and level of  exports, respectively. 355  Domestic Tax Policy and the Foreign Sector 
the case of  1, -  1 the export price elasticity is -  1, and in the two-good 
case the elasticity of the offer curve is m. We also consider cases where net 
trade flows rather than the gross flows enter the benchmark calculation. 
We take the same p and q values as for the central case in our first 
formulation.  is set at 1.7. In our sensitivity runs, &,is  set at 0.5,1.0, 
and 3.0. 
For the capital service flow formulation, a critical parameter is EK, 
which expresses the sensitivity of  the foreigner’s behavior to differences 
between the rental rates on capital employed in the United States and 
abroad. In our central case under this formulation, we set EK  at -  1.0; in 
sensitivity runs we consider values of  0, -0.1,  and -  10.0 for EK. 
Another key parameter in this formulation is RATIO, the ratio of the 
foreigner’s benchmark endowments of  capital services, import commod- 
ities, and export commodities to the United States endowment of capital 
services, level of imports, and level of exports in the benchmark. RATIO 
is a rough indicator of  the “size” of  the rest of  the world relative to the 
United States. In our central case, we set RATIO  equal to  5;  in sensitivity 
runs, we consider values of  2 and 10 for RATIO. 
A final and important sensitivity analysis in this case involves the return 
to capital. In the central case, when foreigners rent to the United States, 
they receive PK, the real net-of-tax rental price of, or return to, capital. 
PKF is paid to the United  States when Americans rent  to foreigners. 
Because  of  the tax  system in the United  States, a differential exists 
between the marginal product of  capital (the gross of  tax price) and the 
net-of-tax return to capital. Thus the United States gains if it rents capital 
services from abroad, since the United States collects the marginal prod- 
uct of capital but pays the net-of-tax return to capital. Conversely, if  the 
United States rents capital to the foreigner, the United States suffers a 
loss for the same reason. To correct for this, we calculate a tax rate which 
applies to international capital service transactions and use this new rate 
in one of  our sensitivity cases. 
For the capital good formulation, the critical parameters are Z,, Z,, 
and Z3.  These parameters determine the sensitivity of  domestic house- 
holds and of  the foreigner to differences between domestic and foreign 
rates of return. We use values of 250 for Z1,  50,000 for Z2,  and 0.5 for Z3 
in our central case. In sensitivity cases we consider values of 1,000, 100, 
and 10 for Z1,  100,000 for Z2,  and 0.25 and 1.0 for Z3. 
10.4.1  Savings Deduction 
In table 10.2 we show model results for a single tax policy-an  80% 
savings deduction-under  the different  external sector  formulations. 
This policy, described in detail in Fullerton, Shoven, and Whalley (1982), 
represents a move from the current income tax system toward an expend- 
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Table 10.2  Further Analysis of 80% Savings Deduction in United States Income 
Tax (dynamic welfare effects in present value of compensating 
variations over time) 
Welfare Effect* 
1.  Original Fullerton-Shoven-Whalley 
type of  formulation  538  ( 1.10) 
2.  CONS ELAS NO ARM (central case)  511  (  1.04) 
3.  CONS ELAS WITH ARM (central case)  479  ( 0.98) 
4.  CAP SERV FLOW (central case)  -476  (-.97) 
5. CAP GOOD FLOW (central case)  -33  (-.07) 
Note: All results are from runs including six equilibria spaced ten years apart. An “addi- 
tive” method of  tax replacement  (see subsection 10.4.1) was employed in every case. 
*In  billions of 1973 dollars. The numbers in parentheses represent the welfare gain or loss as 
a percentage  of  the present discounted  value of  consumption  plus  leisure in the  base 
sequence ($49 trillion). 
iture or consumption  tax  system.  The deduction  is  only  80%  since 
roughly 20% of  savings is used for new housing construction, which does 
not incur the “double” taxation of the income tax system. Thus an 80% 
deduction would closely approximate a full consumption tax system. We 
“additively” adjust marginal income tax rates (increasing or decreasing 
all rates by  a certain number of  percentage points)  so that the total 
revenue raised by the government is not altered in  any period by  the 
policy change. We consider six equilibria spaced ten years apart. 
The original analysis suggests a present value gain to the United States 
of $538 billion (1973 prices) from the tax change. It is useful to compare 
this  number with  the discounted present  value  of  consumption  plus 
leisure in the base sequence of $49 trillion (1973 prices). The gain thus 
amounts to 1.10% of  this discounted present value of the economy. Put 
another way, after allowing for the change in the timing of consumption, 
and spreading the gain involved over a number of  years, an 80% savings 
deduction increases total consumer welfare by  1.10% per year. 
The first two external sector formulations do not change this broad 
picture very much.  In the constant-elasticity case with no Armington 
good, the gain falls to $511 billion. With the Armington good, the gain 
falls further, to $479 billion. This result indicates that the terms of trade 
effects of  the tax change are weak, a finding which contrasts with the 
papers by Boadway and Treddenick (1978) and Whalley (1980); these 
studies find significant terms of  trade effects associated with changes in 
factor taxes. These two papers both incorporate a complete Armington 
specification which leads to stronger terms of trade effects. In addition,  in 
the present formulation there are not substantial differences in factor 
intensities of export and import competing industries; as a consequence, 
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The major changes in results occur with the capital service and capital 
good flow formulations. In the service flow case, the $538 billion gain 
changes to a $476 billion loss. The main reason for this has already been 
indicated above: the United States incurs substantial capital service out- 
flows as a result of  the policy change so that the United States foregoes 
the gross-of-tax return to capital (capital’s marginal product), but only 
receives the net-of-tax return. In effect, the foreign tax authority gains at 
the expense of the United States Treasury, as a United States tax credit is 
given for foreign taxes paid. The cumulative capital service outflow in this 
case over fifty years  is approximately  $1.7 trillion.  In the sensitivity 
analysis, we note that the efficiency loss is reduced and even reversed as 
the EK  parameter is reduced toward zero. An interesting policy prescrip- 
tion from this case is that the United States should either have additional 
taxes on capital income received from abroad or revoke the foreign tax 
credit.  The additional tax rates, if  used, should equal United  States 
capital factor tax rates.  This prescription  ignores possible retaliatory 
consequences of such action. The capital good flow case reveals a similar 
result, although the effect is quantitatively weaker. 
10.4.2  Sensitivity Analysis 
In table 10.3 we report our sensitivity analyses for our two constant- 
elasticity formulations. Given that the central case results of  these two 
forms do not differ significantly from each other or from those of  the 
original specification, it may not be surprising that a similar conclusion 
applies for sensitivity cases. The choice of the p.  and -q combination, or 
whether gross or net trade flows are specified, makes very little difference 
in the cases with no Armington good. In the Armington cases, the results 
Table 10.3  Sensitivity Analysis of 80% Savings Deduction in United States 
Income Tax for Constant-Elasticity  Formulations (dynamic welfare 
effects in present value of compensating variations over time) 
Welfare Effect* 
I. Original formulation  (table  10.2, case  1) 
2.  CONS ELAS NO ARM 
538 
Central case (p =  ,465, q = -  10)  511 
p.  =  10, q = -  10  502 
p.  = l,q =  -1  538 
Net rather than gross trade flows  529 
479 
UCA =  .5  446 
a$,  = 1.0  467 
3.  CONS ELAS WITH ARM 
Central case (p = .465, q = -  10, a$,  1.7) 
UCA = 3.0  487 
*In billions of  1973 dollars. 358  Lawrence H. GoulderIJohn B. ShovenIJohn Whalley 
are relatively robust with respect to changes in  Gains fall from $487 
billion to $446 billion as 
In table 10.4 we report our sensitivity  analysis of  the 80%  savings 
deduction cases from table 10.2 for our capital service and capital good 
flow  formulations.  For the capital  service  flow  formulation,  a  most 
dramatic result appears when the gross-of-tax rental price is employed 
instead of  the net-of-tax price in international capital service transac- 
tions. In this case the large loss of  $476 billion in the central case changes 
to a gain of  $562 billion. This gain is even larger than in the cases without 
capital flows. The reason is that with a closed capital market the ad- 
ditional saving caused by the adoption of a consumption tax depresses the 
marginal  product  of  capital  more than with  an  international  capital 
market. This demonstrates clearly the significance in the model of  the 
United States instituting a compensatory tax on capital income received 
from abroad. 
Sensitivity analysis  for the capital service flow formulation also in- 
cluded changing EK from  -1.0  to 0.0,  -0.1,  and  -10.0  and varying 
RATIO, the goods and service endowment ratio, between 2 and 10. As 
expected, the welfare loss is larger for higher absolute values of EK. With 
EK = 0, we get results essentially equivalent to the formulations without 
capital flows. 
is lowered from 3.0 to 0.5. 
Table 10.4  Sensitivity Analysis of 80% Savings Deduction in United States 
Income Tax for Capital Service and Capital Good Flow 
Formulations (dynamic welfare effects in present value of 
compensating variations over time) 
Welfare Effect* 
A. Capital service flow formulation 
1, Central case (table 10.2, case 4)  -  476 
2. Gross of  tax rental price used in place 
3.  EK = .0 (changed from -  1) 
4.  EK  = -  .1 (changed from -  1) 
of  net tax price  562 
525 
192 
-  730 
-  221 
-  601 
-  33 
-  337 
122 
441 
-  38 
-  26 
5. EK  = -  10.0 (changed from -  1) 
7. RATIO  = 10 (changed from 5) 
6. RATIO  = 2 (changed from 5) 
1. Central case (table 10.2, case 5) 
2.  Z, = 1,000 (changed from 250) 
3.  Z, = 100 (changed from 250) 
B. Capital good flow formulation 
4.  Z, = 10 (changed from 250) 
5. RATIO = 2 (changed from 5) 
6.  RATIO  = 10 (changed from 5) 
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Table 10.5  Further Analysis of United States Corporate and Personal Tax 
Integration (dynamic welfare effects in present value of 
compensating variations over time) 
Welfare Effect* 
1. Original formulation  265 
2. CONS ELAS NO ARM (central case)  287 
3. CONS ELAS WITH ARM (central case)  321 
4.  CAP SERV FLOW (central case)  1,031 
497 




5. CAP GOOD FLOW (central case) 
Z2 = 100,000 (changed from 50,000) 
Z3 = .25  (changed from .5) 
Z3 = 1.0 (changed from .5) 
(  ,541 






(  .67) 
Note:  All results are from runs involving six equilibria spaced ten years apart. An “addi- 
tive” method of tax replacement  (see subsection 10.4.1) was employed in every case. 
*In  billions of  1973  dollars. The numbers in parentheses represent the welfare gain or loss as 
a percentage  of  the  present discounted  value  of  consumption  plus  leisure in the  base 
sequence ($49 trillion). 
For our capital good formulation we only report sensitivity on Z1 and 
the endowment ratio in table 10.4, because with an 80% savings case the 
United States saves abroad with no foreign savings in the United States.’* 
Z2  and Z3  are immaterial in this case but have an effect in the integration 
cases reported below, where the capital good flow is in the opposite 
direction. We thus report Z2  and Z3  sensitivity later. Table 10.4 reveals 
significant sensitivity to Z1 values; there is relatively little sensitivity to 
the values for RATIO. 
10.4.3  Tax Integration 
In table 10.5 we present further analyses of corporate and personal tax 
integration  in  the United  States using the alternative external sector 
formulations presented earlier. Here we evaluate a policy of  “full integra- 
tion” as described in Fullerton, King, Shoven, and Whalley (1981). Such 
a policy involves the elimination of  the corporate income tax accompa- 
nied  by  increases in personal taxes on capital income. The corporate 
income tax is eliminated for both domestic- and foreign-owned  firms 
situated in the United States. Individuals are taxed on the basis of  their 
total capital income, whether that income is realized (as dividends, rents, 
etc.) or accrues (e.g.  as retained earnings). 
As with  table 10.2, the two constant-elasticity formulations do not 
make very much difference to results although gains increase rather than 
12. For domestic consumers and more importantly for foreigners, this policy change 
lowers the United States rate of return relative to the foreign rate. Under these circum- 
stances foreigners do not save in the United States (see subsection 10.3.5). 360  Lawrence H. Goulder/John B. ShovenIJohn Whalley 
fall in comparison to the original. The capital service and capital good 
flow formulations, however, yield gains which are significantly higher 
than those under the original formulation. In these cases the gains are 
$1,031 and $497 billion, respectively. Tax integration induces a realloca- 
tion of capital from noncorporate to corporate sectors, since the latter 
experience a larger tax reduction from a policy of  tax integration. This 
leads to an increase in the net-of-tax rental price of capital in the United 
States; the rental price and rate of  return to capital rise in the United 
States relative to the rest of  the world. Under the capital service flow 
formulation, this induces foreigners to rent their capital to the United 
States, while in the capital good flow formulation, this leads to foreign 
saving in the United States. In both cases, the United States experiences a 
substantial efficiency gain since it pays the net-of-tax return as its mar- 
ginal product. We report sensitivity analyses on Z2  and Z3  for the capital 
good flow case; they have an impact in this situation as the foreigner saves 
in the United States (unlike the 80% savings deduction case). 
10.4.4  Value Added Tax 
In table 10.6 we present results from our simulations of  introducing 
four alternative forms of  value added tax (VAT) in the United States. 
Much of  the recent discussion of  value added taxation in the United 
States has been prompted by the VAT systems introduced in Europe over 
the last fifteen to twenty years. The destination-based VAT in Europe is 
seen in some quarters in the United States as a trade-restricting measure 
since exports leave Europe tax-free but imports are taxed as they enter. 
While this view is criticized by many academic economists who stress the 
Table 10.6  Welfare Impacts of Introducing 10% VAT of Differing Types 
(dynamic welfare effects in present value of compensating variations 
over time) 
Income-Type  Consumption-Type 
VAT  VAT 
Origin  Destination  Origin  Destination 
Basis  Basis  Basis  Basis 
1. Original formulation  -  42  -  47  265  26 1 
2.  CONS ELAS NO ARM  -  39  -  39  256  256 
3.  CONS ELAS WITH ARM  -  47  -  47  213  213 
4.  CAP SERV FLOW  261  236  91  106 
5.  CAP GOOD FLOW  -  529  -  467  128  127 
Note:  All results are central case results for runs involving six equilibria spaced ten years 
apart. An “additive” method of  tax replacement (see subsection 10.4.1) was employed in 
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neutrality of either tax base for a broadly based tax, it has nonetheless 
been influential in policy debate. 
We model an origin-based VAT as an equal rate factor tax on both 
primary factors and a destination-based tax as an equal rate final sales tax 
on expenditures in the United States. Under the income-type VAT all 
goods are taxed; under the consumption-type only current consumption 
goods are taxed. We model the latter feature  through a savings deduction 
for the origin-based VAT of  the consumption type. We impose equal 
yield  through an additive replacement  in the income tax; income tax 
collections fall  through a  linear  income  tax reduction  applied  to all 
household income tax rates. These tax changes are thus regressive. 
The VAT is constructed to be a nondistorting tax save for impacts on 
labor supply and savings. The introduction of  this tax alternative there- 
fore implies a scaling down of existing distorting taxes, which produces 
welfare gains. Consumption-type  VAT gains are due primarily to the 
reduction in the intertemporal distortion of  the income tax. In the con- 
sumption-type runs the VAT compounds multiplicatively  with  other 
taxes, and neutrality between origin and destination bases holds exactly 
for the Armington and capital service flow cases and nearly so for the 
other cases. 
The welfare gains in the income-type VAT runs are generally smaller 
than in the corresponding consumption-type VAT runs. The gains are 
smaller because the income-type VAT inefficiently distorts individuals’ 
consumption-saving decisions more than the consumption-type VAT, 
since the former tax applies to investment goods (as well as consumption 
goods) and in effect taxes savings. There is one exception to this general 
result: in the capital service flow case, the gains under an income-type 
VAT are larger than under the consumption-type VAT. The domestic 
rental price of  capital eventually rises (relative to the foreign rental price) 
under the income-type VAT but falls (relative to the foreign price) under 
the consumption-type VAT. As a result, capital is rented to the United 
States under the former tax and from the United States under the latter, 
in the capital service flow formulation. Since, as discussed earlier, those 
offering capital overseas receive only the net-of-tax price of capital as 
compensation, the direction of the capital service flow is favorable to the 
United States under the income-type VAT  and unfavorable to the United 
States under the consumption-type VAT. The favorable effect under the 
income-type tax more than compensates for any adverse impact related 
to the tax’s distortion of  consumption-saving decisions. 
The policy prescriptions from these runs are that foreign trade con- 
cerns regarding destination- versus origin-based taxes do not provide a 
legitimate reason for the United States to introduce a VAT, but a broadly 
based VAT  which replaces existing distorting taxes may be an efficiency- 
gaining tax change. 362  Lawrence H. GoulderIJohn B. ShovenIJohn Whalley 
10.5  Conclusion 
In this paper we have described four alternative external sector for- 
mulations which can be used to represent external sector behavior in the 
Fullerton-Shoven-Whalley tax model for the United States. Our motiva- 
tions are twofold:  to assess the impact of  alternative formulations on 
model findings, and to provide an enhanced capability for the analysis of 
tax policies (such as a VAT) which connect closely with foreign trade 
issues.  We consider two formulations of  merchandise trade behavior 
using  constant-elasticity  excess  demand functions  for foreigners’  be- 
havior.  We  also  consider  internationally mobile  capital  services and 
capital goods. 
Under  these  different  formulations,  we  reinvestigate  two  policy 
alternatives considered earlier by Fullerton, King, Shoven, and Whalley 
(1981)  and Fullerton, Shoven, and Whalley  (1982):  an 80% savings 
deduction in the income tax, and personal and corporate tax integration. 
We also examine the effects of introducing a 10% value added tax, of the 
income type or consumption type, on either an origin or a destination 
basis. 
Results indicate that the different  external sector formulations can 
substantially affect the model’s findings. The allowance for capital service 
flows can either greatly increase the efficiency gain of a tax policy (as in 
the case of corporate tax integration) or turn a significant gain into a large 
loss (as in moving to a consumption tax). Each of the policies we investi- 
gated appears to have the potential to generate substantial capital service 
flows between the United States and abroad. When the net flow is from 
the United States to foreigners, the United States is adversely affected 
since those offering capital receive only the net-of-tax rental price. The 
specification  of  merchandise  and service  trade appears to affect our 
results far less than the capital flow modeling. 
This paper indicates that the evaluation of domestic tax policy is very 
sensitive to the functioning of  international capital markets. Therefore 
further research which  reveals  more precisely  the operation of  these 
markets would be most useful for future analyses. 
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Comment  David G. Hartman 
The analysis of  domestic  saving or investment  incentives  has nearly 
always ignored the role of international  trade and investment. Because of 
the increasing importance of  international  transactions, this paper, which 
“opens” the economy previously  modeled  by  Fullerton, Shoven, and 
Whalley, is particularly welcome. 
The  main contributions  of the paper are in the warnings it gives to  users 
of  general equilibrium  models  which  do not  include  a  sophisticated 
foreign sector. Its lessons should include not only the potential impor- 
tance of  foreign  influences  for domestic policy  analysis but  also the 
unfortunate  nonneutrality of  the simple  “model  closure”  conditions 
usually used to describe the foreign sector. 
In particular, previous versions of  the Fullerton, Shoven, and Whalley 
model had a very simple foreign sector in which the value of net imports 
for each imported good was taken as constant, as was the value of net 
exports for each exported good. The authors assert here that the previous 
specification was unfortunate since foreigners were assumed to respond 
“perversely” to price changes, i.e. with their export supply having a price 
elasticity of -  1. 
In fact, since only relative prices  matter, a negative  foreign  supply 
elasticity, at least locally, is not as  perverse as is alleged. Such an elasticity 
is indicative only of  an inelastic foreign demand for United States export 
goods. That is, there is no reason why the foreign offer curve could not be 
as shown in figure 10.1 over some range. What is important is that far 
from the previous trade specification representing a neutral model clo- 
sure condition, it guarantees that extreme terms of  trade effects will 
result  from United States policy  changes.  So, included  in  all  of  the 
“original formulation” results could be important welfare effects arising 
from the international trade sector. If not literally perverse, the implied 
foreign behavior is at least extreme. This fact not only casts doubt on the 
reliability of previous results but also explains some apparent anomalies 
David G. Hartman is with the National Bureau of  Economic Research and Harvard 
University. 365  Domestic Tax Policy and the Foreign Sector 
in the conclusions one reaches when comparing the authors’ new results 
to the original formulation. 
The new trade sector specification developed in this paper is carefully 
done and attractive in allowing for a range of possible foreign responses 
to United States  policy changes. Unfortunately, the industry detail of  the 
original model is lost at this point, presumably because of  the lack of 
reliable estimates of foreign demand and supply elasticities for individual 
goods. Since the trade balance condition links aggregate foreign export 
supply and import demand, only one parameter is required to completely 
describe foreign behavior: it is determined by the authors’ choices of  p 
and q,  as shown in equation (3.14).  With the qualification that one  cannot 
tell  how  sensitive  the analysis is  to this  aggregation, the results  are 
striking and quite reassuring, in that the welfare effects of  domestic tax 
policies are not sensitive to  the foreign elasticities. That domestic policies 
directed toward savings and investment would not produce major terms 
of  trade effects should not be surprising in light of  the international trade 
literature, which provides contradictory evidence on whether  United 
States import or export goods are relatively more capital intensive. 
In fact, the results in this paper are  weakly supportive of  the notion that 
United States imports are relatively capital intensive (the Leontief para- 
dox). For example, a savings deduction provides greater welfare gains 
when foreign demand for United States exports is highly inelastic (p  = 1 
and -q = -  1) than when  the United States is  virtually  a  price-taker 
(p  = 10 and q = -  10). That is, increased investment results in the expan- 
sion of  United States production of  its import good. Similarly, the “orig- 
inal formulation” estimate of the welfare gain, which was implicitly based 
on highly inelastic foreign demand, was an overestimate if the “central 
case” is taken as the most plausible. Fortunately, the results in general 
show that the welfare effects of  these domestic policy changes do not 
depend significantly on the values of  unknown foreign parameters. 
This standard welfare  analysis neglects both the costs of  short-run 
dislocations  and the changes in  distribution which  accompany  policy 
change. One lesson of  simple trade models is that massive changes in 
production patterns, and hence relatively major adjustment costs, could 
result from changes in factor proportions in an open economy. Also, a 
sizable effect on the distribution of income among factors of  production 
can be produced by smaller changes in the terms of  trade. Thus, along 
with the increased openness of  the United States economy comes the 
greater importance  to policymakers  of  factors other  than aggregate 
equilibrium welfare changes. While these issues are not explored in this 
paper, the authors’ methodology would allow them to be considered in a 
sophisticated fashion. 
While the aggregate welfare effects of policy are found to be insensitive 
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with respect to international capital flows. The conclusion that the usual 
analysis can be quite misleading in a world of highly elastic capital flows 
provides an important warning to researchers. 
That capital flows could play a crucial role in determining the welfare 
effects of  a policy to increase savings or investment should come as no 
surprise  in  the light of  the arguments advanced  by  Peggy  Musgrave 
(1969). Musgrave argued that United States investors will view foreign 
investment  as attractive  when  after-tax  returns abroad exceed  those 
available at home. However, since a portion of  the taxes paid on the 
foreign investment income accrue to the foreign government, the United 
States would earn a greater total return on its capital stock if  foreign 
investment took place only when the after-foreign-tax return exceeded 
the gross return available at home. Allowing only a deduction for foreign 
tax payments, rather than the existing tax credit, would induce firms to 
follow a decision rule consistent with maximization of the total capital 
return, as the authors note here. 
The qualitative results of  this paper follow directly. Any change in 
domestic  policy  which  stimulates  saving produces  a reduction  in  the 
domestic capital return, a capital outflow, and hence a tendency toward a 
loss in welfare. A simulus to investment, on the other hand, produces a 
capital inflow and a tendency toward a welfare gain, as the United States 
government collects a portion of the return to the foreign-owned capital. 
Whether these welfare effects are sufficiently important to change the 
evaluation  of  a given policy depends on the elasticity of  international 
capital flows. Since the size of  this elasticity is highly controversial, the 
range of  alternative results is crucial. 
The range of  results produced by  different elasticity assumptions is 
very wide, but it is important to note that all the alternatives considered 
here are extreme by most standards. For example, under the central case 
of  EK equal to -  1.0 (see table 10.4), only a 10% decline in the United 
States rental price of  capital is required to cause half the United States 
capital stock to  move overseas.  The smallest  alternative  value of  EK 
considered is -  0.1, which still implies a movement abroad of 5% of  the 
United States capital stock in response to such a change in the capital 
return. This criticism should not  detract from the clear thrust of  the 
paper, which is methodological; but one should not be misled into believ- 
ing that the broad range of results reported in this paper are produced by 
comparing the situation of no capital flows to cases of modest elasticity. 
A further caution is that domestic policy measures which are straight- 
forward to describe in a closed economy can become quite complex in a 
world of  mobile capital. The very simple type of corporate and personal 
tax integration considered here represents only one of  a wide variety of 
possible methods, which are discussed by McLure (1979). For example, 
foreigners could be denied relief  from the tax, producing a reduction 
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Obviously, very different outcomes could be expected from the various 
treatments of  international investment  under integration, so caution 
must be exercised in applying the authors’ results. 
This example also highlights the need to recognize the considerable 
stock  of  the United  States capital  currently  invested  abroad. While 
United States investment would not become more attractive to foreign- 
ers, it would become more attractive to  United States investors under an 
integration scheme such as that just described. The welfare gain from 
inducing United States investors to repatriate capital, which is neglected 
here, is the subject of Griffin’s (1974) analysis of  integration. Even under 
the form of  integration considered by Fullerton, Shoven, and Whalley, 
any welfare gains from capital repatriation should exceed those arising 
from foreigners’ investment in the United States of the same amount, by 
the Musgrave argument. Thus the assumption that the original situation 
is one of  no United States capital abroad tends to bias the results. 
Finally, capital flows are assumed in the model to have no impact on 
the foreign demand and supply relations for goods. That assumption is, of 
course, not theoretically justified (see Jones 1967), but is very attractive 
compared to constructing a complete model of  the rest of  the world. This 
simplification would seem quite reasonable, except that direct invest- 
ment, which is of  particular concern in this paper, tends to be highly 
sector-specific.  Foreign  investment therefore can  produce very  direct 
terms of  trade effects, the nature of which depend on such controversial 
factors as whether production abroad is a substitute for or complement to 
United States exports. Given the lack of  evidence on these issues, the 
authors’ specification seems sensible. Even more important, the basic 
domestic  model, with  its  sectoral  detail, does hold  the potential for 
incorporating a more sophisticated description of  foreign investment. 
In general, the results reported here serve as a graphic reminder of how 
carefully tax policy must be conducted in a world of  highly mobile capital. 
Unfortunately, it is with respect to capital flows that the least evidence is 
available. The authors have developed a powerful tool which requires 
much more information before its potential will be realized. 
References 
Griffin, J. A. 1974. The effect on U.S. foreign direct investment of the 
integration of the corporate and personal income taxes. Office of  Tax 
Analysis Paper 22, United States Treasury Department. 
Jones, R. W. 1967. International capital movements and the theory of 
tariffs and trade. Quarterly Journal of  Economics 81: 1-38. 
McLure, C. E. 1979. Must corporate income be taxed twice? Washington: 
Brookings Institution. 
Musgrave, P. 1969. United States taxation of foreign investment income. 
Cambridge: Harvard Law School International Tax Program. This Page Intentionally Left Blank